INTRODUCTION
Increasing crime rates generate considerable public concern over the performance of the criminal justice system. Many citizens would be shocked to learn that the system operates on the basis of mutual cooperation and consultation, rather than the media image of the strident prosecutor battling a committed defense attorney. The actual operation of the American system of criminal justice is vastly different from the ideal adversary system. The reality is bureaucratic bargaining.! Approximately ninety percent of all criminal cases are resolved through the process of pre-trial negotiation or plea bargaining.
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Plea bargaining results from an agreement between the prosecutor, defense attorney, and ocrasionally the defendant. The prosecutor offers the defendant a quid pro quo (charge reduction or sentence recommendation) for pleading guilty. Plea bargaining is a low visability process, one which occurs in a private and informal setting. Decisions are made over lunch or in the hallway of the criminal court building. Moreover, the participants wield such discretion that in most cases they serve as the final arbiters in the sentencing decision.
The practice of plea bargaining has created considerable controversy. Various study groups such as the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and the American Bar Association have endorsed the practice, although recommending certain reforms. 3 However, other groups, specifically the Nixon Administration's National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, have argued for the abolition of plea bargaining.' Given the prevalence of the practice, as well as the widespread disagreement over its use, plea bargaining merits further study and research. 5 This study examines the effect of a prosecutor's values and social background on his rate of plea bargaining. The findings presented here are based on a mail survey of prosecuting attorneys and their assistants in the state of Illinois. 6 The survey instrument contained both open-ended and closed questions focusing primarily on the prosecutor's plea bargaining practices and his view of these procedures. Respondents were also asked to supply biographical data.
The Dependent Variable
Prosecutors' responses to a question on rate of plea bargaining provided the dependent variable for this study. Prosecutors were requested to indicate the percentage of their cases which were resolved through the use of a negotiated plea and the dependent variable is based on the prosecutor's perception of his plea bargaining rate. It was possible to make a crude check of the prosecutor's veracity by comparing his reported rate of plea negotiation with published figures on the percentage of guilty plea dispositions for his county. These figures are included in the report of the Illinois court administrator. Using this technique, one can argue that the perceptions of the responding prosecutors roughly correspond to reality.
While plea bargaining is the most common mode TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1968) .
Mulkey, The Role of the Prosecution and Defense in Plea
Bargaining, 3 POL'Y STUD. J. 54 (1974) . entire population (n = 350) of prosecuting attorneys and their assistants was surveyed. The response rate was forty-four percent (n = 156). Respondent representativeness is always a problem for researchers using a survey research methodology. However, Larry Leslie argues that "researchers surveying issues directly related to homogeneous groups should not be overly concerned about the percentage of questionnaire returns. Representativeness will most likely be excellent. This presumes, of course, that enough responses are gained to meet statistical assumption." Prosecutors represent a homogeneous group within the larger population. Leslie of case disposition throughout the United States, variations do exist. Legal commentators have attributed this variability in the use of guilty pleas to several factors. Some suggest that variations are the result of individual differences among prosecutors. 7 For example, prosecutors often weigh such factors as the magnitude of the crime, the adequacy of the state's evidence, the characteristics of the defendant, and the probable defense attorney in order to determine the costs and benefits of plea bargaining. Differences in each prosecutor's calculations result in variations in plea bargaining rates.
Other commentators argue that the dispositional policies of prosecutorial offices may reflect community norms and attitudes. 8 In Chicago, the prosecutor's office encourages plea bargaining, whereas in Baltimore it does not. These differences reflect variations in community attitudes toward criminal justice or at least variations in the way prosecutors perceive community attitudes. Furthermore, some prosecutorial offices, have attempted to decrease the disparity in the bargaining rates of assistants through the establishment of plea bargaining policies. In Chicago, for instance, the supervising state's attorney of the narcotics division developed guidelines on the minimum sentence recommendation and/or charge reductions which assistant state's attorneys could offer in narcotics cases.
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The data on variations in plea bargaining rates suggest that further investigation is needed. By focusing on the prosecutor's rate of plea bargaining as the dependent variable, it will be possible to determine how much variation in bargaining rates is due to independent variables such as prosecutorial values and social background characteristics.
The Independent Variables
Background studies assume that the investigation of such characteristics will provide clues for understanding decisions. This assumption is based on the supposition that certain background characteristics and experiences are conducive to particular attitudes and values which in turn influence behavior. Although researchers have analyzed the relationship between background traits and the behavior of decision-makers such as legislators, bureaucrats, and judges, they have yet to examine Using social characteristics as independent variables indicates whether the variables which affect the behavior of other decision-makers also exerts an influence on prosecutors. Moreover, the discovery that common variables affect several political phenomena facilitates the integration of research findings.
In addition to background characteristics, another independent variable will be analyzed-the prosecutor's support for organizational values present in the criminal court environment. Social scientists assert that the organizational pressures of the criminal court and the personal goals of the participants, induce prosecutors to value efficiency in the courtroom and co-operation with colleagues.' 4 The prevalence of values such as efficiency and cooperation is conducive to the use of plea bargaining. However, researchers must still determine the extent to which support for these values affects variations in reported plea bargaining rates. Using these values as independent variables allows the researcher to do so. prosecutors from low status or minority backgrounds might empathize with the defendants who crowd the criminal courtrooms. Plea bargaining provides one method of giving defendants a "break," i.e., a reduction of charges or a favorable sentence recommendation. Thus, prosecutors from such backgrounds should engage in plea bargaining more frequently. The Langdell case method represents the primary pedagogical technique of American law school professors.iS The originator of this method, Christopher Columbus Langdell, contended that the purpose of legal education was to teach students governing legal principles.
9 He argued that his method provided a scientific means of achieving this knowledge. The instructor utilizing this method presents students with a mass of appellate court decisions attempting to engage students in a Socratic dialogue. In this way, students learn to analyze, distinguish, and synthesize cases. Theoretically, this method teaches students to "think like a lawyer."' 2 0
Despite the predominance of the casebook method, important qualitative differences exist in American legal education. Law schools range from the night and part-time proprietary schools, to a middle level often associated with state and private universities, and finally to a group of top ranked schools such as Harvard and Yale. 42-47 (Winter, 1974-75) . [Vol. 69 searchers may disagree over the criteria for ranking law schools, they acknowledge that there are differences between proprietary or independent law schools and non-proprietary schools or those affiliated with a state or private university.2 Typically, the instruction at the proprietary law schools stresses knowledge of precedent rather than the method of analysis. Such schools concentrate primarily on local and concrete law, placing emphasis on preparing students for the state bar examination.2 The method of instruction is generally straight lecturing, with little discussion of the political, social, or economic aspects of a particular case. Moreover, the faculty members tend to be private practitioners who teach on a part-time basis.
Ladinsky and Lortie found that the nature of one's legal education affected career patterns.
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Students from proprietary law schools were much more likely to become solo practitioners than students from nonproprietary law schools. Additionally, law firms rarely recruited candidates from proprietary law schools, on the assumption that such candidates lacked the skills needed to handle complex legal problems. Confirmation of these findings is provided in a more recent study of the Chicago Bar. Heinz, et. al. , discovered that firm lawyers were disproportionately drawn from elite schools (Harvard and Yale), while solo practitioners were more often graduates of local schools (Loyola, DePaul, John Marshall, Kent). s Furthermore, Smigel observed that Wall Street law firms placed considerable emphasis on recruiting students from particular law schools; students educated in elite schools, were expected to have obtained both the values and expertise needed to represent .high status clients.
2 6 This reasoning assumes that students assimilate the values and perspectives which are a part of their training. Draw-
YER 176-79 (1954 ing an analogy to proprietary legal education, one might hypothesize that the proprietary law school with its emphasis on the rules of a particular jurisdiction, would produce students with a myopic perspective of the legal system. Such students may fail to appreciate the more philosophical issues of the adversary system and the rule of law. In contrast, students attending nonproprietary schools in which analysis and method are stressed would be more inclined to have a broader perspective of the legal system and more likely to support the rule of law and the adversary system. What effect would these differences have on the reported plea bargaining rates of prosecutors? One might assume that prosecutors trained in the proprietary law schools would adapt more readily to the norms of the criminal court organization than prosecutors from nonproprietary schools. This is particularly true since lawyers from nonproprietary schools may view plea bargaining as conflicting with the ideals of the adversary system and the rule of law. in the socialization of newly appointed federal judges. 32 Additionally, appointees with prior judicial experience had fewer adjustment problems than judges without this experience. Apparently, the more experience one has within an organization, the more likely it is that he will adhere to the norms of that organization. The values or preferences which govern the conduct of actors in the criminal court organization include co-operation with colleagues and concern for efficiency. According to Abraham Blumberg, the criminal court organization "co-opts" its participants so that they favor organizational values such as efficiency and production.3 4 He maintains that concern for administrative efficiency overrides concern for individual rights. In this context, Jerome Skolnick argues that most criminal attorneys will attempt to compromise. 35 He notes that the nature of American criminal justice encourages the development of informal relationships between the prosecution and defense. Co-operation occurs because participants want to avoid conflict. Co-operation also makes it possible for prosecutors to advance personal goals. Both prosecutors and their assistants often view their positions as a vehicle for gaining valuable trial experience before entering private practice. 36 They are anxious to make contacts within the legal community which will later prove helpful. Some are also seeking to develop a professional reputation, because this facilitates a future private practice. 51-52 (1975) .
important for prosecutors to appear as formidable opponents, it is more important that they demonstrate an ability to compromise and adapt to the norms of the criminal court system. Moreover, plea bargaining also benefits the politically ambitious prosecutor or assistant, because it assures a high conviction rate. A high conviction rate provides evidence that the prosecutor is doing his job and establishes a record of success which the prosecutor can refer to in subsequent election campaigns. Consequently, plea bargaining facilitates both personal and organizational goals. Hypothesis 4: Prosecutors who adhere most strongly to values such as efficiency and cooperation will engage in plea bargaining at a higher rate than those prosectors who support these values less strongly.
The following (Figure 1 ) is a graphic representation of the model utilized in this research. While the focus of this research is on arrows 1, 2, 3 and 4, it is likely that the relationships indicated by 5, 6 and 7 are also significant. Each of the relationships in 1, 2, 3 and 4 will be evaluated through correlational analysis. Additionally, the combined effect of the independent variables on reported plea bargaining rates will be explored through the use of multiple regression analysis.
RESuLTs
The hypothesis (H 1) was that prosecutors from ethnic and religious minority groups or lower status backgrounds would be more likely to engage in plea bargaining. Because these individuals are from less advantaged or minority backgrounds, it was hypothesized that they would sympathize with defendants. Plea bargaining would provide a way of individualizing justice and giving defendants "a break". On the other hand, it was hypothesized that prosecutors from non-minority or middle or high status backgrounds would be less concerned with individualizing justice and more concerned with strict adherence to the rule.of law. Therefore, to some extent, they would be less likely to engage in plea negotiations than their colleagues. relationship between a prosecutor's religion or national origin and his reported rate of plea negotiation. Also present in Table 1 is the correlation between the prosecutor's family status (operationalized as father's occupation) and his rate of plea bargaining. The correlation (rho) is low (-.03), which implies that the prosecutor's family status is not associated with his plea bargaining rate. The statistical analyses demonstrate that knowledge of the prosecutor's religion, national origin, or family status is not useful in predicting his rate of plea bargaining. Prosecutors from low status or minority and ethnic backgrounds do not bargain more frequently than prosecutors from high status or non-minority religious and ethnic backgrounds. One explanation for this finding may be that many prosecutors and judges, regardless of individual origin, look to the upper-middle class as their reference group.' As Jacob states, "Many (prosecutors and judges) look forward to where they would like their own children to be rather than backward to where they spent their own childhoods.' 1 If this is the case, then many prosecutors from minority religious or ethnic backgrounds may be emulating their higher status peers. Consequently, background variables would not explain a prosecutor's propensity to engage in plea bargaining. These results, therefore, do not support Hypothesis 1.
The next hypothesis (H 2) is that prosecutors who received their legal training from proprietary law schools would engage in plea bargaining more 4o H. JACOB, supra note 8, at 78-79. 41 Id, at 79. Table 2 demonstrates the strength of the relationship between type of law school training and the prosecutor's reported rate of bargaining. The reported statistic (eta = .10) suggests that the prosecutor's legal training (whether he attended a proprietary or nonproprietary law school) has a minor effect on his rate of plea-negotiation. The fact that one's legal training seems to have little, if any, influence on plea bargaining rates could be due in part to the realities of the criminal justice system.
Critics of legal education argue that law students receive a distorted picture of reality.3 Casebooks, they assert, cannot convey the true nature of criminal law practice. Although knowledge of the criminal law is essential, experience provides one with a greater understanding of the way the courts and the prosecutor's office operate. Students, depending on their legal training, may subscribe to adver- sary ideals in varying degrees. But, once faced with a system which functions'almost completely on the basis of informal negotiations, the new recruit regardless of his training learns to adjust to the system. Reality may override law school values and perceptions and therefore, we find little support for Hypothesis 2. The correlation (Pearson's R) between the prosecutor's legal experience (operationalized as the number of years in the practice of law) and his reported rate of bargaining is presented in Table  3 . It was hypothesized (H 3) that prosecutors with more legal experience will engage in plea bargaining at a higher rate than those with less experience. But, legal experience, as the low correlation implies (.07), has almost no influence on the prosecutor's rate of bargaining. There tends to be minimal differences betweei the experienced prosecutor and the inexperienced prosecutor in terms of the reported frequency of plea bargaining. This does not imply that differences in the concessions a prosecutor is willing to make do not exist. For example, Albert Alschuler argues that experienced and inexperienced prosecutors differ in respect to the types of concessions they are willing to grant. Al-[Vol. 69 schuler found that fear of losing a case as well as a lack of confidence, often led inexperienced prosecutors to offer greater concessions than the merits of a case justified." Another factor which may account for the failure of experience to predict increases or decreases in plea bargaining rate is the lack of variation in the independent variable. Because there were few experienced prosecutors in the survey, it is difficult to determine the exact effect of experience on the prosecutor's propensity to bargain.
The failure of social background, law school training, and experience to predict plea bargaining rates is not particularly surprising. Evidence from studies dealing with the effect of social background variables on judicial decision-making is also inconclusive. 4 were only indirectly related to individual behavior and were actually the precursors of certain attitudes and values which are more directly influential in predicting behavior.
46 This appears to be true for prosecutors as well. As Eisenstein and Jacob point out, background characteristics of prosecutors and defense attorneys influence their experiences and perceptions, and may indirectly influence the disposition of criminal cases. However, the norms and actions of the collective courtroom work group (prosecutors and defense attorneys and judges) mute the role of these personal biases.
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The data arrayed in Table 4 show the relationship between the prosecutor's support or non-support for efficiency in the courtroom, co-operation with colleagues, and plea bargaining iates. (1977) . 4 The independent variables, efficiency and cooperation, represent an index which measures the extent to which prosecutors support these values. The indices are based on answers to a series of Likert scale questions dealing with efficiency and cooperation. These questions were factor analyzed in order to determine which best measured the underlying values of efficiency and cooperation. The following two items (which loaded between .631 and .592 on the first factor) were selected for the index of cooperation: 1) the real job of the defense attorney is to negotiate a plea for his client. 2) the real job of the prosecutor is to negotiate with the defense attorney. These two items (which loaded between .421 and .482) were selected for the efficiency index: 1) Prosecutors (public defenders) need to dispose of their cases as quickly as possible.
2) The efficient handling of cases is of foremost importance in the criminal justice system.
On the basis of their answers to these questions on
1978]
hypothesized (H 4) that as adherence to such values increased, the prosecutor's reported rate of bargaining would also increase.
The correlations (Pearson's R) reveal that support or non-support for efficiency has almost no effect on plea bargaining rates, but that support for co-operation has a somewhat greater influence on the frequency of prosecutorial plea bargaining. Bargaining rates increase as support for co-operation increases, although the correlation is rather weak.
Neither organizational value is particularly helpful in predicting the frequency of prosecutorial plea bargaining. Several factors could explain this: first, support for co-operation is a goal which prosecutors are reluctant to articulate, largely because the public views this goal as illegitimate.
4 9 Thus, the responding prosecutors may have been reluctant to indicate the extent of their support for cooperation. Second, these values could be only indirectly related to the rate of negotiation: support for such values may encourage the development of policy guidelines for handling cases which have a more direct impact on reported bargaining rates. For example, Eckart and Stover noted that public defenders and prosecutors followed certain rules of thumb in the disposition of felony cases. ° First offenders might have their charges reduced to misdemeanors, or defendants facing multiple felony charges may automatically have all but one of the charges dismissed. Although the rules will vary depending on the jurisdiction, each case is treated according to the established rule for that particular category of cases.
Eisenstein and Jacob discovered that policy norms on plea negotiation also existed both in the Cook County State's Attorney's office and in Detroit (Wayne County).
5 ' Failure to comply with official policy in Cook County resulted in disciplinary action. Violators were often called to the supervisor's office and required to explain their behavior.
Such policies would encourage more plea barefficiency and co-operation, the prosecutors received a cumulative score. gaining because they provide a method of settling cases with minimum conflict and expenditure of resources. Such policies may reflect support for efficiency and co-operation, but the linkage between these values and plea bargaining rates may be indirect, thereby accounting for the low correlations reported.
Thus far, the correlational analysis demonstrates that each of the independent variables has a slight effect on reported plea bargaining rates. One shortcoming of such bivariate analysis is that it does not allow the researcher to account for the simultaneous effect of several independent variables on the dependent variable. Nor does it permit the researcher to hold constant other independent variables which can affect the initial relationship under analysis. One way of ascertaining the collective effect of these variables is through a multiple regression analysis. This mode of analysis also gives the researcher an idea of the unique effect of each independent variable, while controlling for all other independent variables.
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The results of a multiple regression analysis are revealed in Table 5 . The four independent variables used in the analysis were: adherence to cooperation, father's occupation, experience, and proprietary law school attendance.5 The squared multiple correlation coefficient (R square) gives the researcher an indication as to how much of the variation in the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent variables in the analysis. The R squared in this instance is .06. In other words, these particular independent variables explain about six percent of the variance in prosecutors' reported plea bargaining rates. Thus, the 52 Several assumptions are required for such an analysis. The assumptions are: 1) a linear relationship exists between the independent and the dependent variables, 2) the data are normally distributed and the independent variables are not substantially correlated with one an- combined influence of these particular independent variables on prosecutorial bargaining rates is not particularly high. Also reported in Table 5 are the standardized regression coefficients (Betas). These demonstrate the relative contribution of each independent variable, while controlling for the other independent variables. Experience is the most important variable affecting the prosecutor's rate of bargaining, but it is only slightly more important than proprietary law school attendance and support for cooperation. Father's occupation has the least effect on the reported rate of bargaining. CONCLUSION Does a prosecutor's background or support for organizational values influence his plea bargaining rate? To some extent, yes. However, given the large amount of unexplained variance in the dependent variable, it is obvious that additional factors account for variation in reported plea bargaining rates. Certainly, additional research is needed. Lawrence Mohr argues that the criminal courts can be better understood if one looks at the behavior of the participants within the framework of a decision-making paradigm.5
4 Following Mohr's suggestion, the model in Figure 2 represents a general outline of the various factors which influence the decision to go to trial or to negotiate a plea.
Social scientists often construct models to assist them in theory-building. A model, according to Lawrence Mayer, is an analytical system that is "developed or constructed so that the logical relationships between its elements correspond in logical form to the relationships between a set of elements in the real world." ' Models then, simplify reality and, in performing this function, allow researchers to isolate certain variables for analysis. Moreover, they serve a heuristic function, suggesting new relationships which logically ought to exist. When these relationships have survived empirical testing, "the task of logically integrating the lawlike propositions generated from the model into theory is facilitated."56
The model in Figure 2 depicts the institutional and environmental factqrs which affect the prosecutor's decision to plea bargain or go to trial. The findings of this research, as well as that of Cole, Skolnick, Blumberg, Jacob and Eisenstein, suggest that institutional variables such as the participants' social background, education, values, ability, sentencing propensities and goals, are indirectly predictive of case disposition.
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Additional institutional factors which are significant include the circumstances surrounding a particular case, i.e., the strength of the state's evidence; the seriousness of the crime, felony or misdemeanor; personal characteristics of the defendant; judicial pressure to clear the court docket; and the defendant's willingness to accept the plea agreement.
Administrative factors also effect the disposition process. Variables such as the volume of cases handled in a particular jurisdiction, the length of time that a case has been on the docket, the number of cases per attorney, and the presence of a professional court administrator all influence dispositions. In addition to these administrative factors, environmental or external forces also play an indirect role in determining the disposition of cases. For example, the nature of the criminal law (state or federal) or the social, political, and economic characteristics of a particular state or locality, are all variables which potentially affect the operation of the criminal court. Researchers have generally tended to ignore this aspeci of the model, but it is important nonetheless. Courts do not operate in a vacuum; they are best understood in an environmental context. Thus, it is necessary for researchers to examine the effect of crime rate, public opinion, or media pressure on the criminal court operation.
The model suggests that it is the interaction among the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge (indirectly) which determines the final outcome of the case. Attorneys assimilate the available information and attempt to estimate the likely outcome of a case; that is, what will occur if the case goes to trial as opposed to what will happen if the case is settled through a negotiated plea. This judgment, in a sense, acts as a filter through which attorneys process information surrounding individual cases. Often this judgment may simply reflect the established policy for disposing of particular cases. For instance, some prosecutor's offices refuse to bargain in certain types of cases-drug cases or carrying a concealed weapon. This type of policy would have an influence on case disposition.
Participants in the decision-making process must weigh institutional factors such as individual values, goals, and abilities along with the circumstances of the case and the defendant's willingness to accept a particular agreement. All of these factors, as well as external factors, are considered in making a final decision on trial or negotiation. Past experience influences an attorney's estimates of a case outcome as well. Moreover, such past experiences serve as the basis for developing policy guidelines on case disposition. Thus, the interaction among those involved both directly (prosecutors and defense attorneys) and indirectly (judges and defendants) results in a decision on case disposition.
The model requires several caveats. First, it needs refinement to determine more specifically what the circumstances are for trial disposition rather than negotiating a plea. In other words, it must consider which of the institutional or environmental factors are weighed more heavily in the final decision to go to trial or to negotiate. Second, further testing of the model should take into consideration differences in plea bargaining styles. It must question whether the kinds of concessions which are made in particular jurisdictions (charge reduction, sentence reduction, or modification of conviction label) effect the decision to negotiate or go to trial. Moreover, researchers should not assume that the model operates in the same fashion in all jurisdictions. Comparisons across jurisdictions are necessary in order to determine the common factors which influence case disposition. This model provides a starting point for future research, for it identifies a number of relationships which need empirical testing. Proceeding in this fashion will allow researchers to develop a theory of plea bargaining.
